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THE FDIC AND OTHER FINANCIAL
INSTITUTION INSURANCE AGENCIES AS
"SUPER" HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE: A LESSON
IN SELF-POLLINATED JURISPRUDENCE
FRED H. MLLER*
ScoTT A. MEACHAM**

Historically, the major players in the credit market have been the obligor,
the obligee, and, in the case of debt arising from a sale, the assignee of the
obligee. If the debt was evidenced by a promissory note, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provided the rules of law that governed the interaction
and relationships of these parties with respect to the debt.' For example, the
UCC determined the liability of the obligor on the instrument. Where the
instrument was negotiated by the payee, the assignee knew that it could obtain a special status known as "holder in due course" (HDC) by meeting

the requirements for that status under the UCC. 2 The HDC status protected

* B.A. 1959, University of Michigan; J.D. 1962, University of Michigan. Professor of Law,
University of Oklahoma College of Law.
** Third year law student, University of Oklahoma College of Law; M.B.A. candidate, University of Oklahoma College of Business Administration.-Ed.
I. Uniform Commercial Code, 1978 Official Text.
2. Under U.C.C. § 3-305 (1978), a holder in due course (HDC) takes the instrument free
of all claims and defenses except defenses of a party to the instrument with whom it has dealt
and a few specified defenses that are "real defenses." Conversely, a person who is not a HDC
takes subject to all valid claims to the instrument on the part of any person and all defenses
of any party that would be available in an action on a simple contract. U.C.C. § 3-306 (1978).
See F. MILLER & A. HARREL, THE LAW OP MODERN PAYMENT SYsTmEis AND NoTES 113 (1985).
The UCC imposes five conditions that must be met to be a holder in due course:
1) The person must be a holder,
2) of an instrument,
3) for value,
4) in good faith, and
5) without notice that the instrument is overdue or has been dishonored or of any
defense against or claim to it on the part of any person.
U.C.C. § 3-302(1) (1978).
A "holder" is defined as "a person who is in possession of ... an instrument ... drawn,
issued or indorsed to him or to his order to bearer or in blank." U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (1978).
An "instrument" means a negotiable instrument. Id. § 3-102(l)(e). In context, a negotiable instrument is a writing signed by the maker which contains an unconditional promise to pay a
sum certain in money and no other promise, order, or obligation except as permitted by law,
and which is payable on demand or at a definite time and is payable to order or to bearer.
Id. § 3-104(l).
A holder of an instrument, even if taken for value, in good faith and without notice, however,
does not become a HDC of the instrument:
(a) by purchase of it at judicial sale or by taking it under legal process; or
(b) by acquiring it in taking over an estate; or
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the assignee against claims of other parties to the instrument and most defenses

of the obligor to the payment obligation contained in the instrument. 3 These
relationships were relatively settled, 4 and the parties could take comfort in

knowing what their relative rights and liabilities were at any given time.
This assumption has been dramatically changed in the wake of a wave of
recent financial institution failures with the introduction of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC) as new players. 6 The FDIC and the FSLIC have contended that because they are governmental entities with the duty of protecting the safety and stability of the financial services system, they should not

have to play by the same commercial law rules. Both the FDIC and the FSLIC
have been able to convince some federal courts that they should be accorded
a unique status when seeking to enforce the obligations formerly held by a
failed financial institution.7 The result is that a series of recent cases have
(c) by purchasing it as part of a bulk transaction not in regular course of business
of the transferor.
Id. § 3-302(3).
3. Id. § 3-305.
4. These principles go back as far as Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758).
5. The number of bank failures has risen 1,100%, from 10 in 1981 to 120 in 1985. During
this same period, the number of problem banks has risen 411%, from 223 to 1,140. CENSUS
BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF ComNMcE, STATsTcAL ABSTRACr OF TE UNrrED STATES, No. 810 (1987).
6. To date, no reported case involving the National Credit Union Administration insurance
program has been located. However, it appears the same considerations would be involved as
with the FDIC and FSLIC. Also, 12 U.S.C. § 1787(i)(2) (1982) closely follows the wording of
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1982), which often is considered a root of authority for the FDIC exercise
of the super powers discussed in this article.
7. The FDIC may acquire obligations owed to failed banks in the course of paying off
depositors. The FDIC has two basic methods of paying off the depositors of a failed bank:
direct pay-off anod liquidation of the assets, or a purchase and assumption transaction. In a
purchase and assumption, the FDIC as receiver arranges for a financially stable bank to "purchase" the failed bank and reopen without disruption of banking operations or loss even to
uninsured depositors. For that reason, this is the preferred method. The FDIC, as corporate
insurer, agrees to purchase the unacceptable or substandard assets of the failed bank either from
the purchasing bank or the FDIC as receiver, depending on how the particular purchase and
assumption transaction is structured. Then, the FDIC in its corporate capacity proceeds to liquidate these assets to obtain reimbursement for the funds it advanced from the insurance fund.
Additional reinbursement is provided by any premium the purchasing bank may have paid for
the failed bank's deposits and good assets. Hence, the FDIC can be acting in two capacities:
as receiver and as corporate insurer. See generally FDIC v. Leach, 772 F.2d 1262 (6th Cir. 1985);
Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982); Norcross,
The Bank Insolvency Game: FDIC Superpowers, the D'Oench Doctrine, and Federal Common
Law, 103 BANK
L.J. 316, 318-19 (1986); Burgee, PurchaseandAssumption TransactionsUnder
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 14 FORUM 1146, 1151-58 (1979).
Courts have awarded the FDIC holder in due course status under federal law only in its corporate capacity for the reasons discussed later in this article. Otherwise, in this context, the FDIC
as receiver stards in the same position as the bank (except, perhaps, as altered by 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(e) (1982)).
In contrast, the cases involving the FSLIC have involved that agency as receiver for the insolvent savings and loan association. See, e.g., Lupin v. FSLIC, Nos. 85-5896, 86-828, 86-1126
(consolidated) (E.D. La. Mar. 30, 1987), where the court adopted the Gunter rule to bar the
obligor's defenses of fraud and securities laws violations but did not seem to realize the significance
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declared that when the FDIC or the FSLIC acquires an obligation in connec-

tion with a failed financial institution, they are entitled to something akin

to the status of a HDC under federal law.8 They are given this status even
though they would not be considered a HDC in these circumstances under
the UCC. 9

Neither the FDIC nor the FSLIC could be a HDC under the Code in these
cases because they are purchasers in bulk in a transaction that is not in the
regular course of business of the transferor.

In addition, the obligations that

the FDIC or the FSLIC acquire often are in default, and under the Code
there can be no HDC on a note that is transferred with notice that it is over-

due.II Further, to be a HDC, one must first be a holder.' 2 Because the FDIC
and the FSLIC are purchasers in bulk, the instruments acquired are not in-

dorsed. Thus, it is unlikely that they could ever achieve HDC status.

3

Also,

the FDIC or the FSLIC often would have notice from either the institution's

records or the terms of the instrument itself that the obligor has a potential
defense, and such notice is fatal to HDC status."' Finally, many notes acquired today will be nonnegotiable instruments. 5 The UCC provides HDC
status only with respect to negotiable instruments.' 6

of the FDIC operating in its corporate capacity. The same failing is evidenced in the Hsi case
cited infra at note 8.
8. As to the FDIC, see, e.g., FDIC v. Leach, 772 F.2d 1262 (6th Cir. 1985); FDIC v. Wood,
758 F.2d 156 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985); Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d
862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982). As to the FSLIC, see, e.g., Lupin v. FSLIC,
Nos. 85-5896, 86-828, 86-1126 (consolidated) (E.D. La. Mar. 30, 1987); FSLIC v. Hsi, 657 F.
Supp. 1333 (E.D. La. 1986).
9. Compare U.C.C. § 3-302(3)(c) (1978) with, e.g., Gunter, 674 F.2d at 873. In the Gunter
case, the court held that the obligor's fraud claims against the insolvent bank were no defense
where the FDIC acquired the note in execution of a purchase and assumption transaction, for
value, in good faith, and without actual knowledge of the fraud at the time the FDIC entered
into the purchase and assumption agreement. See also FDIC v. Leach, 772 F.2d 1262, 1267
(6th Cir. 1985) (court adopted Wood rule and held obligor and guarantor's defense of failure
of consideration was barred); FDIC v. Wood, 748 F.2d 156, 161 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 308 (1985) (court adopted the Gunter rule to bar usury claim of guarantor of the note).
10. U.C.C. § 3-302(3)(c) (1978). See comment 3 to the section: "It has particular application
to the purchase by one bank of a substantial part of the paper held by another bank which
is threatened with insolvency and seeking to liquidate its assets."
11. U.C.C. §§ 3-302(1)(c), 3-304(3) (1978).
12. Id. § 3-302(1).
13. Id. While they would have the rights of the institution as a holder under U.C.C. § 3-201,
that would not create a foundation for HDC rights; and the institution itself, if the defense
is good, cannot assert HDC rights. Id. § 3-305(2).
14. Id. §§ 3-302(1), 1-201(25). See also F. MILLER & A. HARRELL, supra note 2, at 104-10.
15. A variable rate note is not a negotiable instrument. See Northern Tr. Co. v. E.T. Clancy
Export Corp., 612 F. Supp. 712 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Farmer's Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Arena, 145
Vt. 20, 481 A.2d 1604 (1984). Some notes also will fail of negotiability because their terms subject them to another agreement, usually a mortgage or security agreement. See, e.g., Holly Hill
Acres, Ltd. v. Charter Bank, 314 So. 2d 209 (Fla. App. 1975). If the note is a consumer obligation, either or both of state and federal law may operate to preclude negotiability or the HDC
aspect of that concept. See, e.g., U.C.C.C. §§ 3.307, 3.404 (1974); Federal Trade Commission
Trade Regulation Rule on Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1975).
16. U.C.C. § 3-305 (1978). A status similar to that of HDC may be the result of a "waiver
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Nevertheless, the FDIC and the FSLIC have been accorded HDC status
as a matter of federal law and not under the UCC. The UCC has not been
enacted by Congress for federal transactions; and in these cases, because of
the involvement of a federal instrumentality, the liability of the obligor on
the note involves federal and not state law.' 7 Since no federal statute or regulation specifies HDC status for the FDIC or the FSLIC, the issue is whether
the federal common law rule should be fashioned after that of the Code or
whether a different rule should apply. The courts rendering the decisions so
far have concluded that the rule should vary from that of the Code."8
This article analyzes the reasoning used by the federal courts in fashioning
a federal common law rule different from that of the Code. Then it suggests
that the rationale employed by these courts is flawed, fails to support the rule,
and fails to properly account for the negative impact of such a rule on commercial transactions. This article thus argues that the FDIC and the FSLIC
(and any similar financial institution insurance agency) should play by the
rules provided by the UCC.
The Bases for HDC Status
The analysis of the cases affording HDC status upon the FSLIC appears
to be wholly dependent on the cases according that status to the FDIC. Thus,
an independent discussion regarding the FSLIC will not be undertaken.' 9 Since
no reported, case has been decided involving the insurance instrumentality for
credit unions, likewise no independent discussion will be presented in that
regard.
With respect to banks and the FDIC, the federal common law rule that
protects the FDIC from most defenses of the maker of a note appears to
arise for one or more of three reasons. The first reason is the case of D'Oench

of defenses clause" (see, e.g., id. § 9-206), but such clauses seldom if ever appear in notes because
the law itself accords HDC status law if the holder and the instrument qualifies.
17. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); D'Oench Duhme & Co. v.
FDIC, 315 U-S. 447 (1942).
18. This point of view has been defended. See, e.g., Platt & Darby, A Primer on Special
Rights and Immunities of the FederalDeposit InsuranceCorporation, 11 OKLA. Ciry U.L. RaV.

683 (1986).
19. For example, in Lupin v. FSLIC, Nos. 85-5896, 86-828, 86-1126 (consolidated) (E.D.
La. Mar. 30, 19E,7), the court stated that the common law rationale and policy enunciated in
the D'Oench deciion is an independent basis [from 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1982), which "codified"
the D'Oench'dochrin,,but which only applies to the FDIC] for protecting both the FDIC and
the FSLIC fronrmecret agreements and other defenses such asfraud,failure of consideration, and
estoppel. Hovrevet, to the extent the doctrine has only been used to protect the FDIC in its
corporate capacity, a qualification should be drawn. In the Lupin case, the FSLIC brought suit
as receiver- This was also true in the other FSLIC cases cited in note 8, supra. In this context
the FDIC has not bees awarded HDC status, and under the analysis used by the courts deciding
the issue, theze i; no justification to extend protection beyond the concept of section 1823(e)
and to the emplutsized situations. See Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 873 n.15 (11th Cir.
1982) (distinguisting FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974), where fraud was held to be
a,defense to 4n action by the FDIC acting only in its capacity as a receiver).
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Duhme & Co. v. FederalDeposit Insurance Corp.,20 as codified and limited
by section 1823(e) of title 12 of the United States Code. 2' The second reason
for the rule is an analysis predicated upon United States v. Kimbell Foods,
Inc. ,21 which requires that several factors be balanced, including the need for
a uniform rule, the policy objectives of the FDIC, and the potential harmful
impact on state commercial transactions of adopting a rule of law contrary
to state law. A final reason for the rule derives from the frustration that courts
have experienced in trying to draw lines as to which state law defenses section
1823(e) knocks out. These courts have simplified the problem by expanding
the statutory rule to knock out all defenses that would not be good against
a holder in due course on the theory that this reflects the will of Congress.
Each of the three bases for the rule is examined in turn.
The D'Oench Doctrine
In D'Oench the FDIC brought suit on a demand renewal note executed
by D'Oench, Duhme & Co. (D'Oench) and payable to the Belleville Bank &
Trust Co., which had been charged off by the bank. 23 D'Oench had sold the
bank certain bonds, which later defaulted. The predecessor notes to the renewal
note were executed to enable the bank to avoid showing any past due bonds
as assets. However, the receipts for the notes clearly indicated that they were
not to be called for payment and that the interest payments made were to
be repaid. In short, a side agreement contradicted the face value of the
obligation.
The Court stated that the liability of D'Oench on the note was a federal
question governed by federal law. 24 It concluded that the statutes governing
the FDIC revealed a federal policy to protect the FDIC and the public funds
that it administers against misrepresentations by way of secret agreements,
the effect of which is to diminish the value of the assets of banks the FDIC
insures or to which the FDIC makes loans.2" Thus, the Court held that a
person who executes an instrument that is in the form of a binding obligation
is estopped to assert as a defense the fact that the parties simultaneously secretly
agreed that the instrument should not be enforced.2 6
Congress responded to D'Oench by enacting section 1823(e) of title 12 of
the United States Code.27 Section 1823(e) invalidated contemporaneous

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

315 U.S. 447 (1942). D'Oench is discussed infra at notes 23-38.
Discussed infra at text accompanying notes 27 & 33-37.
440 U.S. 715 (1979).
315 U.S. 447 (1942).
Id. at 456.
Id. at 457-58.
Id. at 459.
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1982) provides:
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the right, title, or interest of the
Corporation [i.e., the FDIC] in any asset acquired by it under this section, either
as security for a loan or by purchase, shall be valid against the Corporation unless
such agreement (1) shall be in writing, (2) shall have been executed by the bank
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agreements that diminished the face value of assets such as in the D'Oench
case, unless they were clearly reflected on the records of the bank for all,
including the FDIC, to see. Nothing in the statute, however, speaks to the
invalidity of a defense not arising from a contemporaneous secret agreement,
such as usury, fraud, or the like.
Nonetheless, in FederalDeposit Insurance Corp. v. Rockelman,2 8 the FDIC
was accorded protection from such defenses. In Rockelman the FDIC sued
the maker of a note who raised fraud as a defense. The alleged fraud consisted of assertedly false statements made to induce the purchase of stock.
The note was given as the purchase price for this stock. Without analyzing
whether either the D'Oench rule or section 1823(e) was applicable, and without
citing any authority, the court stated:
[T]he court concludes that, although the FDIC, in its corporate
capacity, is not a holder in due course within the meaning of that
term under the Uniform Commercial Code, Congress intended by
means of section 1823 to clothe the Corporation with the protections afforded a holder in due course and shield the Corporation
2 9
against many defenses that would otherwise be available.
Such a bold assertion without supporting authority on a law school exam
would receive an unsatisfactory evaluation. But courts are different. Thus,
the court in Gunter v. Hutcheson" also found that D'Oench provided a general
basis for a federal policy to protect the FDIC and that section 1823(e) was
designed to broaden this protection so as to enhance the federal policies that
favor protefting the banking system. As a result, the Gunter court believed
these policies supported its federal common law holding that the maker of
a note under facts similar to those in the Rockelman case was precluded from
asserting fraud as a defense to his liability on the note.3 '
In fact, however, the intent of Congress appears to be quite to the contrary. As the court in FederalDeposit Insurance Corp. v. Blue Rock Shopping Center, Inc. points out, 3" one of the purposes of section 1823(e) was
to codify the D'Oench rule. Further, the court noted that, by its terms, section
1823(e) does not protect the FDIC against all defenses. The Blue Rock court
quoted from the congressional comment on the purpose of the section:
and the person or persons claiming an adverse interest thereunder, including the
obligor, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the bank, (3) shall
have been approved by the board of directors of the bank or its loan committee,
which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said board or committee, and

(4) shall have been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official record
of the bank.
28. 460 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Wis. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Wood v. FDIC, 474 U.S. 944
(1985). See also FDIC v. Rosenthal, 477 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D. Wis. 1979), where the court

cites itself in Ro:kelman.
29. 460 F. Supp. at 1003.
30. 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).

31. Id. at 872 n.14.
32. 766 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1985).
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[U]nder section 13(e) of this measure [1823(e)] as amended certain
conditions for the first time are imposed upon a bank in the event

agreements are entered into between customers of the bank and
the bank. Priorhereto and up to the time of an unfortunate inter-

pretation of the law it was believed that all legal agreements entered
into by the bank and obligor 3were binding on the Corporation.
96 Cong. Rec. 10,731 (1950).1
More extensive evidence of Congress' true intent with regard to section

1823(e) is provided by the two other references to section 1823(e) in the
legislative history of the provision. 3 The first reference exists in the committee hearings on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act of 1950. 3- This
reference clearly indicates that, in enacting section 1823(e), Congress was only
thinking of contemporaneous, secret, and unwritten agreements between the

33. Id. at 753 n.26 (emphasis by the court).
34. The lack of legislative history itself suggests that Congress did not consider that it was
making any extensive or controversial changes in existing law. The major debates on this bill
were whether the amount of insurance should be increased from $5,000 to $10,000, whether
the assessment methods should be modified, and whether the FDIC should have expanded examination authority. See Amendments to FederalDeposit InsuranceAct, 1950: Hearingson S. 2822
Before the Comm. on Banking & Currency of the House, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) [hereinafter
Hearings]. In fact, one congressman, after presenting the proposed changes in these areas to
the House of Representatives for consideration, made the following comment regarding the other
changes made by the bill: "There are numerous little changes in the law which, growing out
of experience, are largely administrative changes. I have mentioned to you, however, I believe,
the only major changes which the law contemplates." S. 2822, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 96 CONG. Ric. 10649 (1950) (statement by Rep. Smith). Certainly, a provision intending to
give the FDIC HDC status as a matter of federal law would have been a major and perhaps
controversial change.
35. In committee hearings on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act of 1950, the
following discussion took place between Representative Multer and H. Earl Cook, Director of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation:
Mr. MULTER. There has been considerable litigation through the years during
the existence of the Corporation [i.e., the FDIC] in which contentions have been
made that agreements between the banks and debtors have not been lived up to
after the banks were closed down and that the FDIC, in collecting the assets of
the bank, was put in a more favorable position than the bank itself would have
been and that the FDIC could ignore the agreements with the debtors .... Can
you tell us briefly whether or not there is any objection to putting into this proposed law an amendment to require the FDIC to comply with any such agreements
that have been made in good faith and which are properly recorded between the
debtors and the banks?
Mr. COOK. I think that statement of yours covered the ground entirely-where
you are properly supported by such agreements and are not dependent upon oral
agreements that have no binding effect.
Mr. MULTER. I think the policy of your bank [the FDIC] is to honor any such
bonafide agreement.
Mr. COOK. We never back away from a bona fide agreement, and when the record
is clear we inherit the obligation and stand by it. We cannot be bound when there
is no record.
Hearings, supra note 34, at 41-42.
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bank and the customer that would reduce the apparent value of the obligation. Certainly, there was no intent that section 1823(e) would act to bar other
defenses arising from the transaction, such as fraud in the inducement.
Indeed, Congress' intent in adopting section 1823(e) was apparently to restrict
the FDIC's powers, not to expand them. Congress believed that the FDIC
generally should stand in the shoes of the failed bank with regard to defenses
by obligors. As one congressman stated in offering a friendly amendment
to section 1823(e):
It was never the intent of Congress to give the Corporation [i.e.,
the FD(CI a stronger position than that of the bank and the adoption of the amendment ... is offered to prove that heretofore it
was the intent of Congress that any agreement in the absence of
fraud, was binding on the Corporation. 6
The amendment passed. 37 Hence, it appears that in enacting section 1823(e),
Congress intended only-to estop a debtor who has committed a fraud from
enforcing the terms of a contemporaneous, secret, and unwritten agreement
against the FDIC.
Clearly, the facts do not support the assertions in Rockelman and Gunter
that Congress intended for the FDIC to be accorded HDC status as a matter
of federal common law. If the FDIC and the FSLIC are to be holders in
due course as a matter of federal common law in situations beyond what state
law would afford, the basis for that position must come from another source.
The Kimbell Foods Basis for HDC Status
A second reason for the federal common law rule that affords the FDIC
protection akin to that of a HDC is the Eleventh Circuit case of Gunter v.
Hutcheson2 The Gunter case involved a suit brought by the obligors for
rescission of a $3 million note. The obligors claimed that the failed bank's
officers and directors fraudulently induced them to execute the note by
misrepresenting various aspects of a transaction in which the obligors had
agreed to purchase the stock of another bank. Subsequent to the obligors'
purchase of that bank's stock, that bank also failed. The fraudulent
misrepresentations claimed by the obligors included the following: that the
first bank would leave a $7 million certificate of deposit for at least one year
in the bank purchased by the obligors; that the obligor's bank would have
a federal funds line of $1 million through the first bank; that the first bank
was in sound financial condition and would continue to offer sound financial
support to obligors' bank; that obligors' bank would net $500,000 per year

36. 96 CoNo. R c. 10732 (1950) (statement of Rep. Walter).
37. Id.

38. 674 F.2d 862 (llth Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982). The court cited its result

as being consistent with Rockelman, 460 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Wis. 1978), which of course it
is, but that is hardly persuasive given the weakness in Rockelman's analysis. The court also
cited Gilman v. FDIC, 660 F.2d 688 (6th Cir. 1981), but Gilman simply cited the district court
opinion in Gun,er.
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and obligors' would make enough in dividends to pay the interest on their

notes; and that the interest on the notes would be deferred in certain instances. 9
The FDIC counterclaimed for payment of the note, relying both on section

1823(e) and on the notion that the FDIC was a HDC under federal common

40
law. The FDIC was granted summary judgment by the district court. The

court of appeals upheld the district court's decision, holding that even though
some of the obligors' defenses were not based on secret agreements and, thus,

they nevertheless were barred by the HDC
were not barred by section 1823(e),
4
rule of federal common law. 1
In reaching its decision, and in fashioning this rule of federal common law,
the court used the test outlined by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Kimbell Foods, Inc. "2 The court concluded that although state law furnished

a uniform rule, the state law rule did not adequately advance the purposes
of the federal program involved. First, the court reasoned that the decisions

necessary for the FDIC to determine the appropriate method to handle a bank
failure must be made expeditiously to preserve the going concern value of

the bank. Second, the court thought that subjecting the FDIC to unlimited
potential loss due to claims and defenses it did not have time to evaluate

would make itonearly impossible for the FDIC to utilize the preferred purchase and assumption method. Further, the court reasoned that the FDIC
could legally use the purchase and assumption method, as opposed to other
assumption method will reduce
available methods, only when the purchase and
43

risk or avert a loss to the insurance fund.

Finally, the court reasoned that imposing a different federal rule would

not disrupt commercial relationships predicated upon state law because there
could have been a HDC under state law. Thus, the court ruled that the FDIC

is protected from fraud claims when it acquires a note in execution of a purchase and assumption transaction, in good faith, for value, and without ac-

tual knowledge of the claims at the time of entering into the purchase and
assumption transaction."
39. 674 F.2d at 866 n.5.
40. Id. at 865.
41. Id. at 873.
42. 440 U.S. 715 (1979). The Kimbell test for selecting an appropriate federal rule of common law involves a balancing of the following factors: the need for a uniform federal rule;
whether application of the state law rule as the federal rule would frustrate specific objectives
of the federal program involved; and the extent to .which application of a federal rule different
from the state law rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law. Id. at 728-29.
43. For a description of a purchase and assumption transaction, see Gunter, 674 F.2d at
865-66. A problem would exist, according to the Gunter court, if HDC status were not granted
to reduce potential loss. In a liquidation the maximum liability of the FDIC is fixed by the
$100,000 per depositor insurance limitation; but in a purchase and assumption transaction, the
FDIC agrees to purchase in its capacity as corporate insurer any unacceptable assets. Thus, in
a purchase and assumption transaction the FDIC could incur obligations beyond $100,000 per
depositor. Id. at 870 n.10.
44. Id.at 873. The court also believed any other result would gut section 1823(e) as the
obligor could merely assert as fraud the failure to perform the same unwritten agreement, the
breach of which may not be asserted against the FDIC under section 1823(e). Id. at 871-72.
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The Sixth Circuit was the next court to adopt the federal common law HDC
rule to protect the FDIC. In FederalDeposit Insurance Corp. v. Wood,4
the FDIC brought suit in its corporate capacity against a guarantor on a note
that the FD[C had acquired as part of a purchase and assumption agreement.4
The guarantor raised the defense that the note was usurious under state law,
a defense clearly beyond the purview of section 1823(e). Applying a Kimbell
Foods analysis,47 the court concluded that the FDIC takes free of all defenses
that are not good against a HDC where the FDIC, in its corporate capacity,
acquires a note as part of a purchase and assumption transaction, for value,
in good faith, and without actual knowledge of any defenses."' Moreover,
this opinion explicitly goes beyond HDC status under state law to "super"
HDC status. The FDIC was held to have no duty to examine the assets of
the failed bank before it agrees to execute a purchase and assumption transaction. The fact that the note had a stated rate higher than the legal rate
and that the note was in the bank's files was not sufficient to put the FDIC
49
on notice as to the possible defense.
Finally, in another recent case, FederalDeposit Insurance Corp. v. Leach, 0
the court used similar reasoning and held that the obligor's and guarantor's
defenses of failure of consideration could not be asserted against the FDIC.
The claimed defense arose out of a real estate transaction where the note was
given to the vendor to secure the release of the real estate. The vendor assigned the note to the failed bank but never conveyed the real estate. Once
again, the court held that since the FDIC in its corporate capacity did not
have actual knowledge of this defense, the defense could not be asserted against
the FDIC.
Line-drawing Difficulties Under Section 1823(e)
as a Basis for HDC Status
The last reason for the decisions awarding HDC status to the FDIC is the
judicial expansion of the scope of section 1823(e) because of the difficulty
With all deference, fraud and breach of contract are not the same and, in any event, the result
outstrips this rationale when it extends to defenses the court itself admitted were not based on
an agreement and thus not barred under section 1823(e).
45. 758 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1985).
46. The FDIC can bring suit in its capacity as a receiver of the failed bank or in its capacity
as a corporate in.urer. The Gunter decision limited the HDC rule to the latter context where
the note was acquired in a purchase and assumption transaction. 674 F.2d at 872. The Lupin
decision, discussed supra note 19, which affords the FSLIC similar rights, overlooks or ignores
this fundamental point and is flawed for that reason.
47. 758 F.2d at 159-61.
48. Id. at 161. The cases relied on as authority are, essentially, Gunter and Gilman. Thus,
the self-pollination process proceeds apace.
49. Id. at 162. The court's approach eliminates the no-notice (as opposed to no actual
knowledge) requirement for a HDC for all practical purposes. Under this standard, it is hard
to conceive when the FDIC would ever have notice of a claim or defense in the ordinary purchase and assumption transaction. In addition, since being bound by notice from the records
of the bank is implicit in section 1823(e), this ruling deviates even farther from the apparent
intent of Congress as to the status of the FDIC.
50. 772 F.2d 1262 (6th Cir. 1985).
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in deciding which defenses section 1823(e) was intended to knock out. Expan-

sion eliminates the need to draw lines to prevent circumvention of the section. This analysis was readily apparent in the Gunter case. The Gunter court

believed the Gunters' fraud claims were not barred by the express language
of section 1823(e) because the Gunters' defenses were not based on an oral

agreement. Instead, the Gunters claimed that no valid obligation existed
because of the fraud in failing to perform certain oral agreements." The court
nevertheless barred the Gunters' defenses, reasoning that if the Gunters were

allowed to assert their fraud defenses in this instance, "the obligor would
successfully thwart the 'no agreement' protection of § 1823(e) 'by asserting
as fraudulent the same unwritten agreement of which a breach ... may not
under § 1823(e) be asserted against the FDIC'."' 2 Thus, it is apparent that

the court was mistakenly concerned with not allowing the Gunters to circumvent section 1823(e), even though by its terms section 1823(e) clearly did not
apply.
A recent case that clearly shows the courts' difficulty in determining the

scope of section 1823(e) and which opted for expansion of the section to avoid
difficult line drawing is FederalDepositInsurance Corp. v. Langley." Langley

involved a real estate transaction where the failed bank misrepresented loan
terms and the amount of acres and corresponding mineral rights in the underly-

ing property. The obligors contended that the misrepresentations concerning
the amount of acres in the property and its mineral rights were outside sec-

tion 1823(e).
The court, however, said that the defenses were part of an overall undisclosed

arrangement with the failed bank concerning both loan terms and the property to be purchased. The court believed that "to allow the Langleys to shift

the focus of their defense in the instant case would create an unacceptable

'end run around § 1823(e)'."' 4 By expanding the concept of "agreement,"
the court held that the obligor's defenses emanated from an agreement that

had the effect of misinforming the FDIC and, thus, was barred by section
1823(e)."1 In essence, the court expanded the scope of section 1823(e) because
it could not draw an effective line between those defenses that are a part
51. 674 F.2d at 867.
52. Id. at 871-72 (quoting FDIC v. Lattimore Land Corp., 656 F.2d 139, 146 n.13 (5th Cir.
1981)).
53. 792 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 56 U.S.L.W. 4026 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1987) (No. 86-489).
54. Id. at 546.
55. Id. In reaching its decision, the court cited itself as being "strong authority" for the
proposition that the language of section 1823(e) is "all encompassing." Id. at 545. Interestingly,
the court believed it was effectively blocked from resting its decision on the HDC concept because
the bank failed after it had brought suit against the obligors and the defenses had already been
raised. Thus, the FDIC arguably had actual knowledge of these defenses. The court indicated
that knowledge of an agreement raising defenses is irrelevant in relation to section 1823(e), which
appears literally to be true.
In affirming the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court stated that as a matter of contractual analysis
the bank made certain warranties regarding the land, the truthfulness of the warranties was a
condition to performance of the debtors' obligation to repay the loan, the warranties were a
part of the accepted meaning of the word "agreement" in a commercial context, and it could
be "safely assumed" that Congress did not mean to use the word "agreement" in a narrower
sense in section 1823(e). 56 U.S.L.W. 4026, 4027-28 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1987).
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of the agreement itself and those defenses that are collateral to the agreement, but which arise out of the same transaction.
A Criticism of the Kimbell Foods Analysis
as a Basis for HDC Status
The decisions awarding HDC status to the FDIC depend on a rule of federal
common law that differs from the UCC rule. In Kimbell Foods,6 the Supreme
Court held that, once it is determined that federal law governs, the question
of whether to adopt state law as the federal rule or to fashion a different
federal rule depends on a balancing of several factors." The factors that a
court must balance are: the need for a national uniform body of law; whether
application of the state law rule would frustrate specific objectives of the federal
program; and the extent to which application of a different federal rule would
disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law."
It is well established that federal law applies in actions involving the FDIC. 9
The only real issue is whether the governing rule of law should be provided
by state law or whether a distinct federal common law rule should be fashioned.
In each of the above cases awarding the FDIC HDC status based on the
Kimbell Foods doctrine, the courts used the balancing process and determined
that the FDIC should be protected by a federal common law rule that gives
the FDIC a status akin to or better than that of a state law HDC. The FDIC
was accorded such a status even though it did not meet all of the requirements for a HDC under the UCC. For the reasons discussed below, it is submitted that the balancing of the Kimbell Foods factors by these courts is
erroneous.
The Need for a Nationally Uniform Rule of Law
The need for a uniform federal rule can hardly be disputed. As the court
As the discussion of the legislative history of section 1823(e) indicates, assumptions by the
courts as to what Congress intended have not been particularly accurate. See supra text at notes
33, 35, and 36. However, the root problem with the decision of the Court appears to be its
starting point that a misrepresentation, such as made by the bank about the property, is a warranty and thus a part of the agreement of the parties. Perhaps the statement of the Court on
this point can be limited to the facts of this case. Unfortunately, it is not so qualified. Where
the proper line between a misrepresentation and a warranty lies must depend upon the facts
of each case. Equating a misrepresentation with a contractual undertaking, without more, creates
a cause of action in strict liability where otherwise only a defense or no liability might exist.
See J. FLEmvo, TORTS 607, 612 (6th ed. 1983); C. MoRus, TORTS 298-306 (2d ed. 1980).
On balance, th! Court's possible expansion of section 1823(e), while more limited than the
expansion effected through the "super holder in due course" doctrine, appears equally unsupported. Unfortunately, it also raises issues as to the status of the FDIC as receiver (see supra
notes 7 and 19) and as to the status of the FSLIC and the NCUA, which do not have section
1823(e) in their arsenal of weapons. But see infra notes 100 and 101. Accordingly, it is even
more important now for Congress to clearly express its will.

56. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
57. Id. at 727-28.
58. Id. at 728-29.
59. See, e.g., D'Oench Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942); Gunter v. Hutcheson,
674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
60. 766 F.2d 744, 748 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting FDIC v. Rodenberg, 571 F. Supp. 455, 460
(D. Md. 1983)).
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in FDIC v. Blue Rock Shopping Center, Inc., stated: "[H]olding the FDIC
to different standards of care in different states would frustrate its attempts
to promote the stability of, and confidence in, the nation's banking system." 6
Clearly, a uniform federal rule would assist the FDIC in carrying out its duties
as insurer of the nation's banking system, if for no other reason than it would
promote simplicity and economy. However, the need for a uniform federal
rule hardly necessitates the rejection of a rule of state law. Each state, including Louisiana, has adopted article 3 of the UCC, which governs commercial
transactions and provides for HDC status. These statutes have been adopted
with very few changes from the uniform text of the Code, at least with respect
to the status of a HDC in nonconsumer transactions. 6' Thus, state law is
uniform in this respect and would serve to meet the FDIC's need for
uniformity.
This proposition has been recognized in cases where the issue was not HDC
status but the rights of an accommodation party. The Third Circuit in FDIC
v. Blue Rock Shopping Center, Inc.,6 " stated: "[W]e will 'follow the model
UCC and those cases which best supplement the UCC and further its purposes and design'." ' 63 The Blue Rock Shopping Center case involved a suit
brought by the FDIC in its corporate capacity against a party to a negotiable
instrument executed in favor of the failed bank. The party claimed that it
was an accommodation maker and that the FDIC had unjustifiably impaired
the collateral securing the instrument. The court held that the rule of section
3-606(1)(b) of the UCC should govern the dispute.
Frustration of Specific Objectives
of the FederalProgram
The second factor involved in the Kimbell Foods analysis is whether application of a state law rule would frustrate specific federal objectives. 64 In
analyzing this factor, it is helpful to keep in mind that the central purpose
of the FDIC is to bring to depositors sound, effective, and uninterrupted opera65
tion of the banking system with resulting safety and liquidity of bank deposits.
In FDIC v. Wood, 66 the court started with the above premise and then
stated that the use of a purchase and assumption agreement is a "dramatically" effective way for the FDIC to fulfill its purpose. 67 Then, the court

61. See REPORT OF AM. BAR ASS'N SuBcobim. ON CoMM. PAPER AND BANK DEPosrrs AND
COLLECTIONS OF TnE UCC Comm., NoNuNiFolum SECTIONS iN ARTICLES 3 AND 4 OF THE UNIFOmu

COAERCIAL CODE app. B and C (1985) (on file with the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking
and Business Law).
62. 766 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1985).
63. Id. at 749 (quoting United States v. Unum, 658 F.2d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1981)).
64. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979).
65. FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 160 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing S. REP. No. 1269, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMYN. NEWS 3765, 3765-66), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 944 (1985)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 161. This is because the operation of the bank is not interrupted and the acquiring
bank takes over all deposits, so no loss of uninsured deposits occurs.
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concluded, as have other courts, 68 that subjecting the FDIC to potential state
law claims would "in many cases prevent the transaction." ' 69 The court's rationale for this last proposition is that Congress allows purchase and assumption
transactions only when the FDIC first determines that the cost of a purchase
and assumption transaction would be less than the cost of a liquidation, and
that the FDIC would be unable to make such a determination, or, at the
least, could not make it quickly, if it first had to evaluate assets because of
its potential exposure to unknown claims and defenses. 70
There are several questionable aspects about this line of reasoning. The
court does not consider the second part of the statute, which dispenses with
the need for cost evaluation where "the continued operation of such insured
bank is essential to provide adequate banking services in its community." 7'
This is an exception that, arguably, must be read generously to justify the
HDC role for the FDIC. The federal HDC rule itself emphasizes the importance of a purchase and assumption transaction because banking service to
depositors will not be disrupted. Of course, in most cases depositors can, with
some inconvenience, transfer their business to another bank. Congress
presumably removed the cost evaluation restriction primarily for cases where
no other bank existed to service the depositors of the failed bank. However,
the purchase and assumption method also is touted because (1) it does not
freeze funds and thus impact on other components of the intricate financial
system; and (2) because it does not cause a loss of confidence in the banking
system. 72 Vievied in this light, very few banks would be able to cease operations without impact because they'are nonessential in providing adequate banking services to their communities. In short, a strict cost evaluation perhaps
should not be the only consideration in applying the statute.
Even if a strict cost evaluation remains the test, the statute only states that
the FDIC shall not provide assistance in an amount in excess of what the
FDIC determines to be "reasonably necessary" to save the cost of liquidation.73 This appears to mean that the FDIC only needs to make a rough estimation of the failed bank's assets and not a precise calculation. The FDIC does
68. See, e.g., FDIC v. Leach, 772 F.2d 1262 (6th Cir. 1985); Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d
862, 870 (llth Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).

69. 758 F.2d at 161.
70. Id. at 161. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (1982) states:

No assistance shall be provided under this subsection in an amount in excess of
that amount which the Corporation [FDIC] determines to be reasonably necessary

to save the cost of liquidating, including paying the accounts insured of such bank,
except that such restriction shall not apply in any case in which the Corporation
determines that continued operation of such insured bank is essential to provide
adequate banking services in the community.

The court also noted in passing that subjecting the FDIC to defenses when it acquires a note
would unjustifiably give the maker of that note preferential treatment over depositors and other
creditors of the tank. 758 F.2d at 160. Suffice it to state that a good defense to payment is

quite different from a claim to recover payment, and it is hard to discern a preference in not
having to pay what is not owed.
71. On this point, see Judge Merritt's dissent in Leach, 772 F.2d at 1269-70.

72. See, e.g., Gunter, 674 F.2d at 865.
73. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (1982).
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not need to "know its ultimate losses to the last cent before selecting a purchase and assumption." 74 As the court in Gunterrecognized, the statute only
requires "a reasoned judgment that the risk of a purchase and assumption
'7
is not greater than a liquidation."

For this reason, the court in Wood seemingly overstated the case. 76 Moreover, Judge Merritt emphasized other deficiencies in his dissenting opinion
in the Leach case:
The court in Wood misinterpreted a statute instructing the FDIC
to choose purchase and assumption only when it thinks this will
be cheaper than liquidation as mandating the minimization of the
actual cost of purchase and assumption by immunizing the FDIC
from state law defenses. The Wood rule is clearly not justified by
the policy underlying this statute, and its only certain effect is to
redistribute the cost of bank failure from taxpayers, each of whom
bears only a small fraction of the total cost, to a small number
of note makers whose individual liability may be significant."
Finally, there are other deficiencies with the reasoning of the Wood court
and that of other courts that have followed this view. For example, even if
the state law rule applied subjecting the FDIC to possible defenses, the FDIC
could make a reasoned judgment as to the relative costs of a purchase and
assumption transaction versus a straight liquidation. The applicability of state
law defenses should only be relevant with regard to the amount of uninsured
deposits the FDIC must induce an assuming bank to take since a set cost
in a straight liquidation is the payment of the insured depositors. Thus, the
allowance of the assertion of state law defenses would make a difference in
a purchase and assumption transaction only to the extent that there are uninsured deposits or to the lesser extent of the amount of bad assets, if bad
assets are less than the amount of uninsured deposits.78 That is to say, if
74. The Wood court surmised that subjecting the FDIC to state law claims could force it
to make a detailed examination of the bank's records and, thus, both increase the cost of, and
lose the timeliness that is necessary to effectuate, a purchase and assumption transaction. 758
F.2d at 161. Besides overstating the requirements of the statute, it seems unlikely that such an
examination would be fruitful. Many defenses like fraud or failure of consideration are not apparent on the face of the note or from bank records, albeit a few, such as usury, might be.
See F. MILLER & A. HARRELL, supra note 2, at 164.
75. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 871.
76. Id.
77. 772 F.2d 1262, 1270 (6th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
78. This point can probably be made more clearly through the use of several simple examples
in the following table. It is assumed that the FDIC will recover 100 percent of the value of
the good assets and none of the value of the bad assets.
Insured
Deposits
$75
75
25
25

Unins.
Dep.

Good
Assets

Bad
Assets

Cost
Liquid.

Cost
P &A

Cost
Diff.

$25
25
75
75

$50
10
50
60

$50
90
50
40

$25
65
0
0

$50
90
50
40

$25
25
50
40
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a failed bank has one depositor of $100,000 and one of $150,000, in a liquidation the FDIC would have to pay $200,000. In a purchase and assumption,
both depositors will be covered and the FDIC at most would be out an addition $50,000. Therefore, the FDIC should only need to make a cost evaluation for potential state law defenses for a portion of the bank's assets sufficient to cover the extra cost, if at all. 1 9 Certainly, this should be feasible since
the purchasing bank itself makes a rough pre-purchase estimate of good assets
based on regulatory examination categories, and the statute does not require
the FDIC to go into a more extensive in-depth analysis.8 0
Another imprecision in the reasoning used by courts adopting the federal
HDC rule is that the FDIC in a purchase and assumption transaction is subjected to a certain amount of credit risk, which may make the method more
costly than a liquidation. Yet this consideration is not mentioned in applying
the statutory test.8 1 It is difficult to ascertain a difference between the risk
that a debt is uncollectible due to economic factors and that a debt is uncollectible due to legal defenses, if there indeed is a difference. Just like the
risk of assertion of state law defenses, credit risks are latent and have the
potential of diminishing the value of the assets acquired by the FDIC.
Ironically, it actually appears that the FDIC's underlying objectives might
be better served by allowing the assertion of valid state law defenses. As stated
before, the FDIC's primary purpose is bringing to depositors sound, effective, and uninterrupted operation of the banking system with resulting safety
and liquidity of bank deposits.82 By allowing the makers of notes to assert
valid state law defenses against the FDIC, the entire banking system would
be forced lo bear the risk of improper conduct by the failed bank.
The individual debtor obviously could not control the conduct of the bank
and should not be forced to bear the risk. Forcing the system to bear the
risk should. promote self-regulation and, thus, better practices within the
system. Under the opposite view, which bars most defenses, there is less motivation on a system-wide scale to eliminate improper banking practices of the
sort that give rise to state law defenses. Hence, placing the risk on the banking system as a whole would promote market discipline in the system. This
is an objective the FDIC itself has embraced. 83
79. As of 1985, only 23.9% of total bank deposits were uninsured. The amount of uninsured
bank deposits has been falling steadily since the FDIC was formed in 1934. FDIC ANN. REP.
70 (1985). Therefore, the first two numerical examples in the table in note 78 represent a close
approximation of the actual composition of deposits the FDIC encounters. The "extra cost,"
then, of a purchase and assumption will be a maximum of 25 percent of the bank's deposits,
the amount of uninsured deposits. As the trend toward a greater percentage of insured deposits
continues, the existence of potential state law defenses will become increasingly less important
in the FDIC'; cost balancing. Thus, the impact of potential state law defenses appears to be
much less than s.upposed.
80. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (1982).
81. For example, in Gunter the court used the risk of the unknown defense in holding for
the FDIC, but did not consider the risk of lack of creditworthiness of the note maker or the
diminished value of any underlying collateral.
82. FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 160 (6th Cir.) (citing S. REP. No. 1269, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess., reprintedin 1950 U.S. CONG. & ADmN. NEws 3765, 3765-66), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944

(1985).
83. Norcross, supra note 7, at 316, 344.
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Subjecting the FDIC to state law defenses legitimately only bears upon the
net amount that the FDIC must ultimately pay out of the insurance fund.
Deficiencies in this fund, if any, should be made up by increasing premiums
to member banks. As one commentator stated:
[No statute vaguely implies that debtors ought to be forced to
subsidize the insurance fund. The FDIC's application of its superpowers as bars to the defenses of debtors has expanded well beyond
the bounds originally intended by Congress when it codified the
result reached in D'Oench. Forcing individual, bank, and business
debtors to subsidize a fund created expressly for deposit protection serves no purpose remotely related to market efficiency or
safety. It simply forces a group of debtors to pay for the financial
"sins" of their former bankers.84
Disruption of Commercial Relationships
Predicated on State Law
The final factor requiring analysis under the Kimbell Foods balancing test
is whether application of a federal rule different from the state law rule would
disrupt commercial relationships generally predicated on state law.85 The courts
that have awarded the FDIC "super" HDC status have given this factor short
shrift on the basis that commercial relationships would not be unduly disrupted.
These courts reasoned that the notes could have been transferred to a state
law HDC, in which case the makers' defenses would have been barred.8"
One significant shortcoming of this premise is that the status given the FDIC
exceeds that of a HDC because the FDIC is only bound by actual knowledge
and will prevail absent bad faith. The UCC does not allow HDC status when
the holder has notice of a defense even if there is good faith.87 Another shortcoming is that a maker of a note certainly has no expectation at the time
the note is executed that as a result of an assignment, any defense to payment
will be barred against someone who takes the note in a bulk transfer, perhaps
after it is due, and who may have a clear warning that something may be
wrong. However, under the federal rule, the FDIC is entitled to ignore any such
notice including any implications from a failure in payment. Many HDC cases
that are litigated under the UCC turn on precisely the notice consideration."
If the federal rule of HDC status for the FDIC persists, it may be well
to advise makers who deal with financial institutions to follow the advice once
given by legal services lawyers to consumers: delete the "or order" language.
84. Id. at 345.

85. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979).
86. FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 161 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985); Gunter
v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 872 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
87. U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 1-201(19), (25) (1978). U.C.C. § 3-302(1)(c) will not allow HDC status
where the holder has notice that the note is overdue or has notice of any defense or claim to
it on the part of any person. U.C.C. § 1-201(25) provides that a person has "notice" of a fact
when "he has actual knowledge of it, or has received notice or notification of it, or from all
of the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question he has reason to know
that it exists." (Emphasis added.)
88. F. MILLER & A. HARRELL, supra note 2, at 104-13.
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The reason is there can be no HDC of such an instrument. s9 If this will invoke the final Kimball Foods factor, it raises a more significant potential problem related to the form of negotiable instruments." Many notes today are

not negotiable and, thus, no HDC can exist. Nonetheless, at least one court
has held that the immunity from state law defenses extends to nonnegotiable

instruments. 9 ' If the FDIC is allowed HDC status on nonnegotiable instruments, then the departure from and possible impact on commercial relationships clearly is significant.92 Moreover, in this environment a knowledgeable
commercial debtor may attempt to obligate the FDIC to recognize defenses
as part of the note, as is the case in consumer transactions with respect to
assignees under the Federal Trade Commission "HDC rule." ' 93 In that event,

it would indeed be startling if the FDIC were allowed to ignore a provision
of the very contract it is enforcing. 9
Another disruption of relationships should be perceived to exist if the

"super" HDC status of the FDIC is applied to consumer transactions. Outside
of this context, there basically is no HDC status in consumer transactions."
A decision that the FDIC is a HDC with respect to consumer paper would
be contrary to the policy of most states and the policy of another agency
of the federal government itself, the Federal Trade Commission. Thus, substantial disruption of expectations under other law might occur if HDC status
were imposed with respect to notes given by consumers. 96 And if an exclusion

89. See U.C.C. §§ 3-104, 3-805 (1978).
90. See supra note 15.
91. FDIC v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1984) (FDIC given HDC status
as to unearned premiums on credit life policies). But see FDIC v. Galloway, 613 F. Supp. 1392
(D. Kan. 1985) (no HDC status for FDIC on guaranty agreements acquired as part of purchase
and assumption transaction).
92. See Galloway, 613 F. Supp. at 1402.
93. Federal Trade Commission Trade Regulation Rule on Preservation of Consumers' Claims
and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1987), discussed infra at note 95.
94. The court in FDIC v. Blue Rock Shopping Center, Inc., 766 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1985),
arguably denied the FDIC that ability.
95. See, e.g., U.C.C.C. §§ 3.404, 3.405 (1974), preserving consumer defenses in assigned
paper and in direct loan situations. Many states have similar laws. See also Federal Trade Commission Trade Regulation Rule on Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R.
§ 433 (1975), as amended, to the same effect requiring a contractual provision giving the consent
of the holder to the assertion of claims or defenses by the consumer. Of course, if the defense
arose out of the conduct of the bank that lent the money to the consumer, the bank would
not be able to take free of the defense under U.C.C. § 3-305(2).
Note that in its present form, the FTC rule would not allow a consumer's defenses against
a seller who was merely paid by the bank to be asserted against the bank or its assignee, or
a consumer's defense against a bank that defrauded the consumer to be asserted against the
assignee of the bank when the note was later assigned. However, if the FDIC took assigned
seller paper or a note evidencing a purchase money loan, the FTC rule notice would preclude
HDC status for the FDIC.
96. Admittedly, the FTC rule and many state laws do not clearly deprive an assignee of
a bank that defrauded a consumer or otherwise engaged in conduct that created a defense of
HDC status. However, such assignments were considered to be rare occurrences. See U.C.C.C.
§ 2.403 comment (1969). To permit assignments to the FDIC (which are not rare occurrences)
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for this situation is made, the question arises whether it makes sense to allow
enforcement of some commercial debts notwithstanding valid state law
defenses. Indeed, the policy basis underlying enforcement by the FDIC of
obligations owing to a failed bank despite the existence of valid state law
defenses disappears if the FDIC cannot enforce the portfolio of the failed
bank across the board and, instead, must review the files to sort out nonnegotiable notes and consumer notes.
Proper Analysis Summarized

As the above discussion indicates, under a proper Kimbell Foods analysis,
the FDIC should have to play by the same rules as everyone else. It already

must do so in situations other than a purchase and assumption transaction.9
While the desirability of a uniform rule is clear, this does not mean that the
rule need be one of immunity from valid state law defenses. To apply the
UCC rule would be to apply a uniform rule; it would not detract from FDIC
policy; it would not disrupt existing relationships under state law; and it would
bring the law in this area into line with the overwhelming weight of authority
concerning the rights of the United States on commercial paper in other contexts where, almost without exception, the UCC rule is followed.98
Indeed, the better economic policy also would be served; subjecting the
FDIC to such defenses would promote market discipline within the banking
system as a whole. Thus, application of the state law rule will not frustrate
any specific objectives of the FDIC but, instead, may promote them. Moreover,
as purchase and assumption transactions decrease in favor of modified purchase and assumption transactions, the suggested position may become reality as even the arguably flawed present justification for HDC status may not

exist in the latter type of transaction. 9

to cut off defenses would seem an unjustified intrusion on the policy of these consumer protection laws even if it is not a violation of them as they are now formulated.
97. See, e.g., In re Jeter, 48 Bankr. 404 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985) (holding that FDIC, when
acting as receiver, is subject to same defenses to which its predecessor bank would be subject).
See also infra note 99 as to a further holding by the court.
98. F. MxumR & A. HAPaELL, supra note 2, at 24-26.
99. In a modified purchase and assumption, the FDIC generally only transfers the insured
deposits of the failed bank to the purchasing bank. Then, the purchasing bank is allowed to
buy any of the good assets it wants. The FDIC usually finances this transaction by the FDIC,
as receiver, borrowing from the FDIC in its corporate capacity and pledging the assets of the
failed bank as collateral. Thus, there generally is no good faith purchase by the FDIC in its
corporate capacity, and there is certainly no need to allow the FDIC to avoid state law defenses
in the interest of an expedient transfer of assets and liabilities under a purchase and assumption.
In In re Jeter, 48 Bankr. 404, 410-12 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985), the court refused to apply
the HDC doctrine where the FDIC as insurer only had a security interest in the asset to secure
a loan in a modified purchase and assumption transaction. The court stated that where the FDIC
as receiver borrows money from the FDIC as a corporation under 12 U.S.C. § 1823(d), the
FDIC as a corporation only has a security interest in the assets retained by the FDIC. The court
held that the federal common law rule giving the FDIC HDC status would only apply where
the FDIC in its corporate capacity actually owns the assets.
This type of transaction has become increasingly popular in recent years. Under the Jeteranalysis,
HDC status will not be available to the FDIC under this type of transaction.
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Section 1823(e) and the D'Oench Doctrine
Bringing the rule for financial institution insurance agencies into line with
the rule for other instrument holders would not expose financial institution
insurance agencies to undue risk. Congress has expressly provided the FDIC
with a weapon to protect itself from borderline "fraudulent" agreements
entered into between the failed bank and the obligor, 00 which seems to be
the only justifiable circumstance where protection is needed.', This weapon
0 which provides:
is contained in section 1823(e),"'
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the right, title,
or intere3t of the Corporation [i.e., the FDIC] in any asset acquired
by it under this section, either as security for a loan or by purchase, shall be valid against the Corporation unless such agreement (1) shall be in writing, (2) shall have been executed by the
bank and the person or persons claiming an adverse interest
thereunder, including the obligor, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the bank, (3) shall have been approved
by the board of directors of the bank or its loan committee, which
approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said board or committee, and (4) shall have been, continuously, from the time of
its execution, an official record of the bank.
Note that uinCer section 1823(e) it is not relevant whether the asset is evidenced by a negotiable note, a nonnegotiable note, or a guaranty.
Section 1823(e) represents a codification of D'Oench Duhme & Co. v.
FDIC.'°3 In D'Oench the Supreme Court held that a brokerage house was
estopped from asserting against the FDIC its agreements with a failed bank
that notes given to enable the bank to carry defaulted bonds on its books
would not be enforced.' 0' The Court held that federal policy was to protect
the FDIC from misrepresentations of assets arising in the form of contemporaneous "secret agreements" between the bank and the obligor.10° Congress responded by enacting section 1823(e) to codify and clarify the D'Oench
00
holding.

100. Congre;s likewise provided protection to the National Credit Union Administration at

12 U.S.C. § 1782(i)(2) (1982).
101. This concept is also the principle in D'Oench and thus would be available to the FSLIC
even though tha statutes cited do not apply to it. While there are some differences between the
doctrine and the satute, they do not appear material; but to the extent they are, Congress can
act for the F.SLIC as it has done for the FDIC and NCUA. Indeed, probably the same result
under the D'Oeuch facts would be reached today under U.C.C. § 3-119. Thus, even in the seminal
situation which gt.ve rise to this whole matter, the state law rule is appropriate for federal

transactions.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

For NCUP. provisions, see 12 U.S.C. § 1787(1)(2) (1982).
315 U.S, 447 (1942).
Id. at 461.
Id. at 459.
See, e.g., FDIC v. Blue Rock Shopping Center, Inc., 766 F.2d 744, 753 (3d Cir. 1985);
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The courts applying section 1823(e) or its policy have struggled with one
common problem which, as discussed previously, was one reason for the
development of the HDC doctrine for the FDIC.'17 That common problem
is how to determine the fact situations to which section 1823(e) applies and
those to which it should not. As noted, the courts often have responded by
expanding the scope of section 1823(e). 108
These line-drawing difficulties ought not to expand the scope of section
1823(e) beyond the original scope intended by Congress; rather, courts should
apply the section only as Congress originally intended. Congress clearly intended that the FDIC should stand in the shoes of the failed bank except
10 9
Thus,
with regard to the limited exception carved out by section 1823(e).

the key is to define clearly the exception and its application. In determining
where to draw the line with regard to which defenses are knocked out by

section 1823(e), the analysis must begin by looking to the D'Oench fact situation and Congress' response to that holding.
D'Oench, of course, involved a "secret" agreement between a debtor and
its bank that the notes executed by the debtor were not valid even though

they appeared valid on their face. Congress probably had the same concerns
with the broad language used by the majority in D'Oench as Justice Jackson
did in his concurring opinion.' Therefore, Congress enacted section 1823(e)
to minimize that concern.
Section 1823(e) provides, in essence, only that no contemporaneous agreement that diminishes the FDIC's interest in any asset it acquires is valid against
the FDIC unless it meets certain conditions that render the agreement nonsecret. Committee discussions on the provision make it clear that Congress
was imposing these conditions as a means of establishing that such an agree-

FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 308 (1985); Norcross,
supra note 7, at 316, 328. See also discussion supra at notes 33-37.
Some courts believe that D'Oench still exists as an independent basis for barring certain defenses
of the obligor. See In re Longhorn Securities Litigation, 573 F. Supp. 278 (W.D. Okla. 1983).
This view probably is irrelevant where section 1823(e) applies and so long as D'Oench is not
read for more than the legislative history suggests. See Platt & Darby, supra note 18, at 701-04.
107. A detailed analysis of these cases is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., FDIC
v. Langley, 792 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 56 U.S.L.W. 4026 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1987);
FDIC v. Hatmaker, 756 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1985); FDIC v. Waldrow, 630 F.2d 355 (5th Cir.
1981); FDIC v. Galloway, 613 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Kan. 1985); FDIC v. Willis, 497 F. Supp.
272 (S.D. Ga. 1980); FDIC v. First Mortgage Investors, 485 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
See also Platt & Darby, supra note 18.
108. See discussions supra at notes 51-55.
109. 96 CONG. RiEc. 10732 (1950) (statement of Rep. Walter).
110. Justice Jackson obviously believed that the majority's holding could be read too broadly
and added:
No doubt many questions as to the liability of the parties to commercial paper
which comes into the hands of the Corporation [FDIC] will best be solved by applying local law with reference to which the makers and the insured back presumably
contracted. The Corporation would succeed only to the rights which the bank itself
acquired where ordinary and good faith commercial transactions are involved.
315 U.S. 447, 474 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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ment existed and was binding so it could be taken into account from the inception in evaluating the asset. 11' A main concern was that customers might
assert agreements against the FDIC of which the FDIC had no proof of their
existence.
Thus, Congress' clear intent was that section 1823(e) should apply only to
those few cases where an obligor is attempting to assert the terms of a contemporaneous agreement entered into with the bank of which no record appears against the FDIC. Section 1823(e) was intended to apply whether the
agreement itself is asserted or a theory of fraud or estoppel or the like based
upon its nonperformance is claimed. On the other hand, the section does not
apply where the obligor wants to assert a defense based on an agreement contained in the instrument itself that is sought to be enforced. Examples include
usury or injury to the contractual status of a party to the instrument. Nor
does the section apply to a defense not based on a promise by the bank to
perform a duty, such as fraud in the inducement. A brief discussion of the
application of this definition of the rule of section 1823(e) to some of the
common fact situations which have arisen may be helpful.
The D'Oench and Similar Fact Situations
Applying the above test to the D'Oench fact situation would yield the same
result-the obligor's claimed defense would be barred. The defense would
be barred because the obligor is attempting to enforce a secret, contemporaneous agreement with the bank that the note is not fully enforceable." 2 The
only difference is that section 1823(e) seems to assume, not to impose, the
requirement of a "guilty party" that the D'Oench decision could be read to
impose.
Another common fact situation is where the obligor leaves a term of the
instrument blank, such as the amount, and reaches an agreement with the
bank that a certain amount will be entered by the bank. Later, he discovers
that a higher amount was entered contrary to the obligor's agreement with
the bank.1 3 A variation of this fact situation exists where the maker signs
a note that is later claimed to mistakenly not reflect the agreement." 4 Once
again, section 1823(e) should act to bar the obligor's defense in this situation
because the obligor is attempting to enforce a contemporaneous, unrecorded
agreement with the failed bank against the FDIC.
Moreover, even if the bank's conduct constitutes fraud in these cases, the
obligor should not be able to assert against the FDIC a defense based on
fraud, estoppel, or waiver. The argument that the bank's fraud nullified the
111. See Hearings, supra note 34, at 41-42.
112. See also FDIC v. Hoover-Morris Enterp., 642 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1980). Cf. Gunter v.
Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982), which should have held
that an agreement to defer interest was barred under section 1823(e) even though it was alleged
the defense was fraud based on the failure to perform that agreement.
113. See, e.g., FDIC v. Castle, 781 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1986); FDIC v. Hatmaker, 756 F.2d
34 (6th Cir. 1985); FDIC v. Powers, 576 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
114. Griffith v. FDIC, 47 Bankr. 416 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985).
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transaction and, therefore, no valid agreement resulted simply end-runs section 1823(e)." 5 It should not be relevant whether the bank never intended
to perform the asserted agreement or whether its determination to breach was
a lessor sort; it is the derogation of the value of the asset due to the asserted
agreement that concerned Congress.
Failure of Consideration and Misrepresentation
Another common fact situation that arises is where the bank promises to
do something, such as set up an escrow as partial consideration for the obligor's
execution of the obligation, and then fails to perform.", The obligor's defense
of failure of consideration should be barred if it depends on the assertion
of the terms of an agreement not meeting the requirements of section 1823(e).
Again, even if the defense rises to fraud in the inducement, this defense should
be barred because ultimately it depends on the terms of an agreement not
qualifying under section 1823(e) being asserted against the FDIC.
In some situations, however, failure of consideration and fraud should be
assertable against the FDIC. For example, if the instrument was executed totally
without consideration, lack of consideration should be assertable against the
FDIC because it does not depend upon the terms of a collateral agreement
against the FDIC but arises from the agreement contained in the very instrument the FDIC seeks to enforce. The same result should prevail if the defense
is fraud in concealing the nature of the instrument itself or duress that precludes
the instrument from being a valid contract." 7 Also, the defense should be
assertable whenever the bank makes a material misrepresentation to the obligor
to induce execution of the instrument, but not whenever the bank makes a
warranty or a promise as to performance.'
Defenses Arising from the Agreement
Sought to be Enforced
Several recent cases have involved an obligor raising the defense of usury' 1 9
or impairment of collateral, which releases the obligor as an accommodation

115. Compare FDIC v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1984), where the court
raised this point, with FDIC v. MM & S Partners, 626 F. Supp. 681 (N.D. I1. 1985) and FDIC
v. Hatmaker 756 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1985), where the court did not.
116. See, e.g., FDIC v. Galloway, 613 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Kan. 1985). This may also have
been an appropriate view of the facts in FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974), but the
court did not consider section 1823(e).
117. See U.S.C. § 3-305(2)(b),(c) (1978); FDIC v. Langley, 56 U.S.L.W. 4026, 4028 (U.S.
Dec. 1, 1987).
118. See, e.g., FDIC v. Langley, 792 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd 56 U.S.L.W. 4026 (U.S.
Dec. 1, 1987) (statements as to the property purchased as well as promises as to bank performance).
See also FDIC v. Hatmaker, 756 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1985); Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862
(lth Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982) (same). If both types of misrepresentation exist
in a case, the obligor may prevail even though the other defense is barred. This does not suggest
a need to "broaden" the protection of section 1823(e).
119. See, e.g., FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1985).
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party.' 2 ° Clearly, these defenses should not be barred because they do not
arise from a secret contemporaneous agreement; instead, they arise from the
terms of the executed note itself and are not the type of risk against which
section 1823(e) guards. An obligor should be allowed to assert this type of
defense against the FDIC.
Conclusion
The recent financial institution failures have introduced new players into
the commercial transactions arena. These new players have long been accorded
substantial protections against "secret contemporaneous agreements" between
the failed institution and the obligor. However, some courts have extended
the protection for one or more of three reasons, allowing the FDIC and the
FSLIC (and potentially the NCUA) to take free of most of an obligor's state
law defenses on the instrument.
However, none of these reasons holds up under scrutiny. The legislative
history clearly indicates section 1823(e) was not intended to accord HDC status
to any of these players, and there is no basis in the opinion or policy of
D'Oench, given the congressional response to it, to extend it to create HDC
status. Also, the Kimbell Foods balancing by some courts that see it as the
basis for HDC status appears flawed. Indeed, when the underlying policy factors and arguments are closely examined, it is clear that the objectives of Congress in establishing the federal insurance agencies would be best served by
forcing those agencies to live within the state law rule. Difficulty in line-drawing
furnishes no excuse to go beyond the express protection given to the agencies
by Congress, particularly when clear guidelines to determine cases can be formulated. Thus, these agencies should be subject to the same state law rule
that governs all other commercial transactions of this type in the United States.

120. See, e.g., FDIC v. Blue Rock Shopping Center, Inc., 766 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1985).
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